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WHEN FICTION INTRUDES UPON REALITY:
A BRIEF REPLY TO PROFESSOR CHIN
CHRIS

K.

IIJIMA

*

It must seem ironic to the lay observer that lawyers debate this

issue at all. After all, it is lawyers who often credit themselves with
the legal eradication of racial discrimination. 1 Yet, now we argue
that because our position is somehow more special and sacred than
others, we claim the right to engage in giving free rein to our racial
and gender biases in deciding whom we represent. Leaving that bit
of irony aside, the other jurisprudential chestnut of many legal
scholars is that our profession is a neutral, objective application of
dispassionate rules to static sets of facts. Indeed, that is the way
most of us have been taught in law school from the very first time
we learned to brief a case. But as so many nonlawyers know, it just
ain't so. For much of society-certainly people of color-law oper
ates as the application of normative assumptions masquerading as
objective rules. 2 Indeed, there is no better illustration of how nor
mative assumptions dictate legal analysis than in the discussion of
the difficult issue presented in Stropnicky v. Nathanson. 3

* Assistant Professor and Director of the Lawyering Process Program, Western
New England College School of Law.
As an initial maUer, my reply to Professor Chin should in no way be interpreted
that my respect for his desire to eradicate discrimination and injustice is diminished. I
have learned much from him already and continue to learn from his insight and knowl·
edge. We are friends, colleagues, and brothers in the struggle against racial subordina
tion-and remain so even though we disagree here.
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down racial
segregation in public education).
2. See, e.g., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE KEy WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxv (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
Racial power, in our view,- was not simply-or even primarily-a product of
biased decision-making on the part of judges, but instead, the sum total of the
pervasive ways in which the law shapes and is shaped by ''''[sic]race relations"
across the social plane. Laws produced racial power not simply through nar
rowing the scope of, say, of [sic] anti-discrimination remedies, nor through
racially-biased decision-making, but instead, through myriad legal rules, many
of them having nothing to do with rules against discrimination ....
Id.
3. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). Indeed, with respect
to the decision in Nathanson, I agree with Professor Chin that the decision was wrongly
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Professor Chin's thesis is simple: lawyers should be allowed to
discriminate on the basis of sex, race, gender, national origin and
sexual orientation because the integrity of the legal system's princi
ple of unimpaired advocacy outweighs society's need to compel
equal access. He comes to this conclusion by reasoning that any
other rule is unenforceable, political lawyers whose interest are pro
tecting the rights of the poor and people of color will be dispropor
tionately affected, and that an attorney's relationship with her client
is uniquely different from that of doctor, or clergyperson because
property, liberty, and often life hangs in the balance of an attor
ney's zeal. This is an impressive catalogue of reasons-if only the
basis for his concerns existed in reality.4
decided as to the result. Indeed, I think the decision reflected the formalism that has
infected recent equal protection jurispurdence. See infra notes 9-14 and accompanying
text.
The facts indicate that Nathanson represented men in other aspects of her practice.
See Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39. She even offered to review the Complainant's legal
concern once he expressed his displeasure with her, but he declined and proceeded
without counsel. See id. at 40. Thus, as a factual matter, there is ample indication from
the record that factors other than Stropnicky's "concern" for equal access may have
been at work in bringing the complaint. Moreover, notwithstanding that factual infer
ence, Nathanson's decision not to represent Stropnicky could also have been deter
mined by the factfinder to be a political stance related to her "area of interest" in
eliminating gender bias against women in divorce actions, and not a bias against repre
senting men due to a generalized gender animus. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identi
ties, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning
of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 93 (1998), for a thoughtful analysis of
this point.
4. Since this is only a brief reply, I will limit my remarks to what I believe is
Professor Chin's major assumption. On the other hand, I cannot resist commenting
about his other reasons. The availability of potential pretexts for discrimination cannot
be a reason for prohibiting attorney discrimination. Indeed, if that were the case, all
civil rights law would be unenforceable. With respectt~ those attorneys who have par
ticular interests or political practices advocating for the rights of people of color or
women, the prohibition would probably have in actuality the least effect on them. It is
these attorneys who presumably would be least concerned about the gender or race of
their clients-so long as the stance of the case and the posture of the client's legal
position was strategically in the interest of their longterm goals. Nathanson's practice
specialized in the litigation of divorce issues and their effect and impact upon women's
status in society. As such, she could have rejected Stropnicky on any number of other
permissible grounds, including the fact that she didn't like him and suspected his rea
sons for trying to retain her (i.e., to prevent his wife from retaining her expertise).
Indeed, is Professor Chin suggesting that all laws now forbidding racial discrimination
be dismantled because they have been allowed by the courts to be used as a weapon
against affirmative action?
. Finally, I wonder whether it is not also troubling to Professor Chin, given his argu
ment and his policy concerns, that society would insist on doctors operating on patients
irrespective of their race or other characteristics. I'm sure the medical profession would
argue that the patient/doctor relationship is as privileged, fiduciary, longterm, and de
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Professor Chin makes an admission toward the end of his
piece, and in doing so he lays bare his assumption upon which his
entire argument rests. He acknowledges that in some circum
stances, such as court appointments for indigent clients, an attorney
may be drafted into service over her objections because compelled
counsel is better than "no counsel at all." But unlike Professor
Chin's construction, the world is not a "buyer's market," divided
neatly into those who have the means to pay for any counsel they
choose, including "white shoe firms," and indigents who must take
whomever the court appoints. 5 The world is constructed mostly of
people who have a very limited range-either because of finances
or geography-of attorneys whom they can consider. As such, the
answer to the dilemma posed by Professor Chin-does one want an
attorney who doesn't want to represent you-is really a question of
given the reality of legal representation in this society-with whom
should that power ultimately rest? As between the potential client
or attorney, the answer must be that the power lies with the poten
tial client.
If a client is confronted with an attorney who tells him that she
will take his case only because she is forced to take it, and that the
client's race or gender is repugnant to her, Professor Chin worries
that the poor befuddled potential client will blunder into such a re
lationship without considering alternatives. That may be, but the
more probable reality is that such a client will go elsewhere, and
more than likely accept such representation only if faced with no
effective alternative-a situation in which even Professor Chin
voted (albeit differently and arguably more so) as any relationship between a lawyer
and her client. Thus, the question "do you really want a doctor operating on you who
doesn't want to?" suggests the same answer as Professor Chin's answer to the question,
"do you really want a lawyer who doesn't want you?" Indeed, although somewhat
more attenuated, a moral question is implicated in the question "do you really want a
priest to pray for your soul who doesn't want to?" Thus, is he also suggesting that
doctors and clergypeople be allowed to discriminate for the "integrity" of those particu
lar professions? What about psychiatrists, firefighters, pharmacists?
5. Another powerful operating assumption of Professor Chin's is that "the legal
profession as an institution will decline the opportunity [to discriminate]." The debate
about that particular assumption including issues regarding the systemic inequality of
access to legal services; the lack of dignity and respect often given by lawyers and courts
to people of color, the poor, women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled; the lack of
people of color on the bench or even as court personnel; the lack of people of color or
women as partners in major law firms; the lack of diversity in legal academia in the
teaching and student body, etc., is for another time and place. However, for the pur
poses of this Brief Reply it is sufficient to note that the desire of the legal profession "as
an institution" to seek equity and equal access to justice is neither objective truth nor
documented fact. It is Prof~ssor Chin's assumption-and my hope.
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thinks attorney coercion is acceptable. 6 Thus, his foundational as
sumption that the free play of the legal marketplace negates con
cern for the effects of attorney discrimination is based solely on his
own assumptions about the reality of legal consumers.7 And, it is
that assumption that must bear critical scrutiny.
However, Professor Chin's position raises more fundamental
questions about the nature of how we as a society see the interplay
of issues concerning race. His zealous protection of racial and gen
der discrimination in the "interest of legal integrity" echoes recent
jurisprudence which turns the real world topsy turvy because the
"interests" of formal intellectual abstraction override rectification
of social realities. We live in a perverse, Orwellian time when "civil
rights initiatives" work to diminish the presence of African-Ameri
cans;8 where the geometric shape of a congressional district has
more constitutional weight than a community of color's historic de
nial of Congressional representation;9 where a state university sys
tem that has had a long history of racial discrimination is
constitutionally unable to remedy that condition because of the op
eration of the Equal Protection Clause;lO where the ideal of a color
blind society has been transformed by judicial fiat into a description
of our present condition that in reality leaves us frozen in a color
stratified society.ll
6. Professor Chin's analogy of representation by biased attorneys to biased judges
is not accurate precisely in that client choice exists in the former, but not the latter.
7. Moreover, it sidesteps the major issue with regard to discrimination in the first
place. Even if it were true that Professor Chin's world of legal consumers reflected
reality and the market would alleviate the practical effects of attorney discrimination,
the notion that access to service alone is sufficient harkens back to the old argument
about how separate could truly be equal.
8. The California Civil Rights Initiative ("Proposition 209"), banning the use of
race, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin in public employment, education or con
tracting, was held to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1440 (9th Cir. 1997),
cen. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). At the University of California at Berkeley after the
Board of Regents enacted a ban on affirmative action in 1995 similar to Proposition
209, there is only one African-American student in the fall 1997 entering class of 270.
See Peter Applebome, Minority Law School Enrollment Plunges in California and
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at AI. At UCLA Law School, the projected entering
number of African-Americans is 10, a decline of almost 50% from the prior year. See
id.
9. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (invalidating majority Black Con
gressional districts stating that in reapportionment, "appearances do matter").
10. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.
Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc'y v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
11. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning
to Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.c. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,6 (1995) (describ
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Indeed, traditional racial jurisprudence has come full circle in
that protection of the interests of a beleaguered white population
has become its signpost. 12 The realities and symbols of continued
racial subordination-the "badges of slavery"-recede further from
protection in favor of a formalism masquerading as objectivity. To
allow attorneys to discriminate on the basis of race because "litiga
tion cannot reform the souls of racist lawyers" comes chillingly too
close to the traditional reasons advanced to defend racial
segregation:
[T]he act of a mere individual[ ] ... refusing accommodations to
colored people, cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge
of slavery or servitude upon the applicant[]. ... "It would be
running the slavery argument into the ground[]" ... to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to
make as to the guests he will entertain[ ] ... or deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business.1 3

Indeed, if Professor Chin is wary of the possibility of lawyers
representing people who they dislike because of race or gender, is
he equally wary of soldiers defending comrades on the battlefield
they dislike because of race, gender, or sexual orientation?14
ing how the "transformation of color-blindness from prescriptive ideal into a condition
of societal denial" happens when the notion that the Constitution should be color-blind
becomes" 'We are a color-blind society"').
12. See Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the
Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1995). According to
Natapoff, the Court "has lifted the stigma from whites without addressing the continu
ing pervasiveness of racial discrimination or the increasingly complex implications of a
multiracial polity." Id. at 1079. Natapoff takes, for example, the O'Connor opinion in
City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion), to show
how it casts the situation in Richmond simply as multiple racial groups competing as
equals for power and wealth, recasting the notion of "minority status" as a "temporary
numerically inferior presence in a given locale, rather than a group subject to historic
discrimination and in need of systemic remedy." Id. at 1075.
13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1896) (Bradley, J.) (quoting The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883», overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Professor Chin's position also assumes a world in which racial bias is com
pletely conscious, and that unconscious racial animosity could not operate to impair an
attorney's representation. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 339 (1987) (not
ing that racially prejudiced behavior is often "experienced as a reflection of rational
deduction from objective observation," and the decisionmaker may often be "unaware
of the selective perception that has produced her stereotype"). Although Professor
Chin's parade of horribles regarding the tragic consequences of attorney incompetence
and unethical behavior is truly cautionary, even he, I suspect, would concede that there
have been many instances where a successful representation was made irrespective of
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I, like Professor Chin, am saddened by the number of lives that
have been sacrificed on the altar of incompetent or unmotivated
counsel. But I wonder whether allowing attorneys to reject repre
sentation on bases prohibited to everyone else will solve that.
Moreover, I, like Professor Chin, am concerned about the integrity
of the legal profession. But, unlike Professor Chin, I believe that an
institution and profession that would enforce society'S decision to
ban invidious discrimination, but consciously exempt itself from
that ban neither fosters nor deserves the public trust.

the attorney's personal distaste-conscious or unconscious-for a particular attribute of
her client.

